The Homeland Security Safe-Harbor Procedure for Social Security No-Match Letters: A Mismatched Immigration Enforcement Tool by Coder, Ellinor R.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 86 | Number 2 Article 7
1-1-2008
The Homeland Security Safe-Harbor Procedure for
Social Security No-Match Letters: A Mismatched
Immigration Enforcement Tool
Ellinor R. Coder
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ellinor R. Coder, The Homeland Security Safe-Harbor Procedure for Social Security No-Match Letters: A Mismatched Immigration
Enforcement Tool, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 493 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol86/iss2/7
The Homeland Security Safe-Harbor Procedure for Social
Security No-Match Letters: A Mismatched Immigration
Enforcement Tool
IN TRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 493
I. EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH IMMIGRATION LAWS .................... 499
II. CURRENT TREATMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
NO-M ATCH LETTERS ...................................................................... 502
III. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT SAFE-HARBOR
R U LE ............................................................................................... 50 8
IV . A N ALYSIS ........................................................................................ 5 11
A. The Social Security Administration Is Separate and
Distinct from Immigration Enforcement .................................. 511
B. The Risk of Terminating a Lawful Employee on the Basis
of a No-Match Letter Is Potentially Great ............................... 514
C. The Rule Forces an Impossible Choice ................................... 516
V. WORKING TOWARDS A UNIFIED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
STR ATEG Y ....................................................................................... 5 19
A. The Rule Serves To Increase Cooperative Immigration
E nforcem ent ............................................................................. 519
B. Proposals for Strengthening the Safe-Harbor Procedure ....... 521
C O N CLU SIO N .............................................................................................. 524
INTRODUCTION
Under cover of the predawn darkness of December 12, 2006, over one
thousand federal immigration agents swept into six Swift & Company
("Swift") meatpacking plants across the country.' It was the largest
employment-based immigration raid in history,2 resulting in the arrest of
almost 1,300 employees and 220 criminal indictments related to identity
theft and other miscellaneous charges.3 In addition to its criminal aspects,
the raid and its aftermath undoubtedly affected Swift's long-term financial
outlook. Domestic facilities operated at partial capacity for five months
following the raid while the company scrambled to hire and train
1. Julia Preston, U.S. Raids 6 Meat Plants in ID Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at A24.
2. Editorial, Swift Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at A28.
3. Dianne Soils & Sudeep Reddy, Swift Puts Raid Costs at $30M, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 6, 2007, at 3A. The number of indictments may further increase as the investigation
continues. See id. The Swift raids are particularly momentous because the government
specifically sought to crack down on identity theft as the source of false worker documentation.
See id.
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replacement employees.4 Swift management projected that production
efficiency losses and expenses associated with hiring new employees
would reach a staggering $45 million.5
Furthermore, the financial impact on Swift echoed throughout the
broader meatpacking industry. In the days following the raid, cattle futures
prices fell amid speculation that the Swift raid would decrease market
demand for cattle.6 In addition, retailers providing packaged meat "braced
for more fallout" from the raids.' The raid may also be credited with
tipping off a global restructuring of the leading beef processing
companies.8
The prospect of a $45 million loss is hardly cause for celebration for a
company that operates fourteen percent of the domestic beef production
capacity and reported a $130 million loss in the fiscal year prior to the
raid.9 Nevertheless, Swift executives very well may find themselves
breathing a sigh of relief: they and the company escaped civil and criminal
immigration charges despite an internal audit's revelation of "highly
suspect trends [within the company that] indicated the employment of
illegal aliens.""l  Eight months earlier, IFCO Systems North America
4. Press Release, Swift & Co., Swift & Company Announces Return of Standard Staffing
Levels at All Four Domestic Beef Processing Facilities (May 11, 2007) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
5. Id.
6. Sudeep Reddy, Federal Raid Casts a Pall over Cactus, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec.
13, 2006, at LA (estimating cattle slaughter rates dropping by ten percent during the week of the
raid).
In addition to the raid's financial effects on the meatpacking industry, the communities
surrounding the Swift plants experienced domino effects from the social and financial disruption.
For example, after a raid on a Swift plant in Cactus, Texas, children were left without parents,
businesses without customers, and landlords without tenants. The surrounding community
stepped in to house and feed members of separated families. In addition, the United Way, a local
church, and Swift management donated money to help those affected by the raids. Isabel C.
Morales, Ghost Town: Immigration Raid Leaves a Large Void, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb.
11, 2007, at IA.
7. Reddy, supra note 6.
8. Around the time of the raids, Swift was the subject of numerous "unsolicited inquiries"
for a sale or merger. Sudeep Reddy, Senators Rally on Raids: Actions Show Firms Need Help
Screening Immigrants, They Say, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 23, 2007, at ID. Swift
ultimately announced its merger with the largest beef processor in Latin America in July 2007.
The resulting JBS Swift Group is now the world's largest beef processor. Press Release, Swift &
Co., JBS S.A. Completes Acquisition of Swift & Company (July 12, 2007) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
9. Reddy, supra note 6.
10. See Solfs & Reddy, supra note 3; Press Release, Swift & Co., supra note 4. But see
Dianne Solis, More Arrested at Swift Plants: Immigration Officials Detain 19, Including HR
Employee, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 12, 2007, at 7A (reporting that immigration officials




("IFCO") was not nearly as fortunate. In a raid of equally unprecedented
scope," federal agents detained 1,187 workers from twenty-six states and
charged seven managers from four states with various immigration law
violations.'
2
Both IFCO and Swift knew that they had employed unauthorized
workers, 3 and both cases implicated the underlying issue of identity theft.'4
Yet, the initial government enforcement action at Swift focused only on
low-level employees, whereas both management and non-management
employees were implicated in the IFCO raids. The difference in the
treatment of the two companies perhaps lies in the disparity of their efforts
to comply with immigration laws prior to the raids. Swift management met
openly with federal immigration officials to discuss discrepancies
discovered during an internal audit of employment verification
documents. 5 In contrast, the IFCO investigation began when federal
agents received an anonymous tip that management destroyed employment
verification forms because they knew their employees were not eligible to
work in the United States.'6
11. DHS Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration Practices, N.Y. EMP. L. LETTER (Epstein
Becker & Green, P.C., New York, N.Y.), June 2006, at 4, 4 (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (calling the IFCO raid "the largest single-work-site immigration enforcement operation
in U.S. history").
12. See Eric Lipton, U.S. Crackdown Set over Hiring of Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2006, at A I. The New York Times also reported that no enforcement actions have been taken
against members of the senior management team or the company, but Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") Secretary Michael Chertoff warned that the investigation had not yet
concluded. Id. IFCO operations continued to suffer from the financial fallout of the raid for more
than a year. Press Release, IFCO Sys., IFCO SYSTEMS Reports QI 2007 Results (May 10,
2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
13. Lipton, supra note 12 (reporting that the tip to federal agents in the IFCO case stemmed
from an assistant manager allegedly destroying documents because the employees were
unauthorized); see Julia Preston, Immigrants' Families Figuring Out What To Do After Federal
Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at A13 (stating that approximately four hundred Swift
employees quit after management conducted internal interviews regarding their employment
status, many of whom admitted they were unauthorized); Solis & Reddy, supra note 3 (explaining
that Swift management shared with government officials the unusual "trends" it detected in its
own records of unauthorized workers).
14. See Lipton, supra note 12 (explaining that 1FCO supervisors allegedly paid an
undercover DHS official for false identity documents); Solis & Reddy, supra note 3 (suggesting
the suspected "document rings" at Swift were linked to the subsequent immigration enforcement
action). Secretary Chertoff described the intersection of identity theft and immigration violations
as "a disturbing front in the war against illegal immigration." Press Release, ICE, U.S. Uncovers
Large-Scale Identity Theft Scheme Used by Illegal Aliens To Gain Employment at Nationwide
Meat Processor (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://www.ice.gov/pilnews/newsreleases/articles
/061213dc.htm.
15. Solis & Reddy, supra note 3. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
16. Lipton, supra note 12; Press Release, DHS, ICE Agents Arrest Seven Managers of
Nationwide Pallet Company and 1,187 of the Firm's Illegal Alien Employees in 26 States (Apr.
20, 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release0891.shtm.
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The role the employer plays in self-policing its compliance with
immigration law is precisely the focus of a recent Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") rule that strengthens the link between employment
verification documents and immigration compliance. The DHS Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") issued a final rule on
August 15, 2007, "Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a
No-Match Letter." 7 The rule is designed to clarify the steps an employer
should take following the receipt of an Employer Correction Request letter
from the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). 8 The SSA letter,
commonly known as a "no-match letter," notifies the employer that the
employee's proffered name and social security number ("SSN") do not
correspond with SSA records. 9 The no-match letter is often the result of
routine clerical errors, but it also functions as a red flag-perhaps the
employer's only red flag-that an employee is not legally authorized to
work in the United States.20
In principle, the ICE rule links the earnings reports that an employer
sends to the SSA, known as W-2 Forms, to the employer's obligation not to
hire unauthorized workers under the Immigration and Nationality Act
2'
("INA"). Under the INA, an employer may be deemed to have either
actual or constructive knowledge that it employed someone who is not
authorized to work in the United States.2 The rule amends the regulations
17. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg.
45,611 (Aug. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a). The rule was part of a "package of
initiatives" DHS undertook after the 110th Congress failed to pass a comprehensive immigration
reform bill in the summer of 2007. See Press Release, DHS, Remarks by Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff and Commerce Secretary Gutierrez at a Press Conference on Border
Security and Administrative Immigration Reforms (Aug. 10, 2007), available at http://www.dhs.
gov/xnews/releases/pr_ 186781502047.shtm ("[U]ntil Congress chooses to act, we're going to be
taking some energetic steps of our own.").
18. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at
45,612.
19. Id. The rule also applies to the receipt of a letter from ICE that notifies the employer that
the agency could not confirm the validity of an immigration status document. Id. This Comment
will focus on the SSA no-match letter, though the procedures set forth in the rule are the same for
both the DHS and SSA no-match letters.
20. Id.
21. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000).
22. The INA states that "it is unlawful for a person or other entity.., to continue to employ
the alien in the United States knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien with
respect to such employment." 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2) (emphasis added). Regulations
promulgated under the INA define "knowing" as both actual knowledge and "knowledge which
may fairly be inferred through notice of certain facts and circumstances which would lead a
person, through the exercise of reasonable care, to know about a certain condition." 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.l(l)(1) (2007). The Ninth Circuit interpreted the meaning of "knowing" to include
constructive knowledge in Mester Manufacturing Co. v. INS. 879 F.2d 561, 566-67 (9th Cir.
1989). In Mester, the Ninth Circuit held an employer, despite lacking actual knowledge, satisfied
the scienter requirement because he received notice directly from the Immigration and
[Vol. 86
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promulgated under the INA by adding receipt of an SSA no-match letter to
the list of factors ICE will consider in determining whether an employer
had constructive knowledge that it employed unauthorized workers.23 In
addition, the rule establishes a safe-harbor procedure for employers to
follow upon receiving a no-match letter so that they can avoid a finding of
constructive knowledge. 4
The SSA has traditionally discouraged employers from using the no-
match letter as the basis for taking an adverse employment action against
an employee. Under the rule, DHS now requires that if the employer is
unable to resolve the no-match discrepancy within ninety-three days, "the
employer must choose between: (1) Taking action to terminate the
employee, or (2) Facing the risk that DHS may find that the employer had
constructive knowledge that the employee was an unauthorized alien. 26
Notably, the rule suggests that employers are protected from a finding of
constructive knowledge if they terminate an employee after the safe-harbor
procedure fails to clear the no-match discrepancy. However, the rule does
not require on its face that the employer terminate the employee, nor does it
foreclose the possibility that the employer can take other steps to avoid a
finding of constructive knowledge. The rule is simply a safe-harbor
procedure by which an employer can definitively avoid a finding of
constructive knowledge based on the receipt of a no-match letter.27
The DHS rule received approximately five thousand public comments
during the sixty-day public comment period.28  Labor unions, non-profit
organizations, trade groups, businesses, attorneys, and other individuals all
participated in the comment period. 9 The comments addressed a variety of
Naturalization Service ("INS") that his employees were unauthorized but failed to investigate or
"take appropriate corrective action." Id.
23. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at
45,612.
24. Id. at 45,612-13.
25. SSA, Retirement, Survivors and Disability Insurance Employer Correction Request 2,
http://www.ssa.gov/employer/SSAsampleLetter.pdf [hereinafter SSA No-Match Letter] (last
visited Dec. 5, 2007).
26. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg, at
45,613.
27. See id. at 45,614 ("There may be other procedures a particular employer could follow in
response to a no-match letter, procedures that would be considered reasonable by DHS and
inconsistent with a finding that the employer had constructive knowledge that the employee was
an unauthorized alien."). However, the safe-harbor procedure does not protect employers who
are later found to have actual knowledge that an employee was unauthorized or constructive
knowledge based on sources other than the no-match letter. For example, the employee might
admit she is not authorized, or the employer may receive information that would reasonably lead
it to believe an employee is not authorized. See id.
28. Id. at 45,611.
29. Id.
2008]
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topics, including DHS's authority to promulgate the rule,3° the propriety of
the rulemaking "in light of the congressional debate over comprehensive
immigration reform,"'" the rule's interpretation of constructive knowledge
under the INA,32 the time frames within the safe-harbor procedure,33 and
the possibility that the rule conflicts with antidiscrimination laws.
3 4
In addition to numerous public comments, a group of unions and
businesses petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California for a preliminary injunction." On October 10, 2007,
Judge Charles Breyer granted the injunction, enjoining the rule from taking
effect.36 Judge Breyer noted that the "plaintiffs have raised serious
questions going to the merits" of their allegations that the rule "(1)
contravenes the governing statute; (2) is arbitrary and capricious under the
Administrative Procedure Act; (3) is an exercise of ultra vires authority by
DHS and the [SSA]; and (4) was promulgated in violation of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. '3 7 In response, DHS plans to issue a revised
rule in March 2008.38
This Comment argues that the ICE safe-harbor procedure for
employers who receive an SSA no-match letter is ineffective because it
exposes employers to additional liability under antidiscrimination laws.
This Comment will first identify the perils employers face in DHS's
targeted worksite enforcement actions and will summarize the current
treatment of SSA no-match letters in both immigration and employment
discrimination law. After analyzing the dangers employers face in
terminating employees upon receipt of a no-match letter, this Comment
will outline the changes that the ICE rule makes to INA regulations that
attribute constructive knowledge of an employee's undocumented status to
an employer who receives an SSA no-match letter. This Comment will
then recommend changes to the rule that seek to alleviate the burden on
employers. First, the fact that the employer follows the procedures in the
safe-harbor rule should trigger a rebuttable presumption that the employer
has not discriminated against its employees. Second, ICE should provide
30. Id. at 45,614-15.
31. Id. at 45,615.
32. Id. at 45,615-16.
33. Id. at 45,616-17.
34. Id. at 45,620-21. Other comments addressed whether the rule would encourage en
masse terminations or have a substantial adverse impact on the economy. Id. at 45,621-22.
35. See infra note 88.
36. Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, No. C07-
04472 CRB (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
37. Id.
38. Julia Preston, Revised Rule for Employers that Hire Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
2007, § 1, at 34.
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employers with another option at the conclusion of the safe-harbor
procedure. Instead of forcing employers to choose between (1) electing to
terminate the employee and (2) risking a finding that the employer had
constructive knowledge that the employee was not authorized to work, the
employer should have a third option to request ICE verification that an
employee is work-eligible. A self-reporting mechanism would provide the
employer with a definitive answer as to whether its employees are work-
eligible, and it would support the employer's efforts to comply with the
INA by terminating employees who are not lawfully eligible to work.
Before explaining the procedures in the safe-harbor rule, it is helpful
to understand both the difficulties that employers face in complying with
immigration laws generally and the potential legal liability employers
invite by using the no-match letter as the basis for adverse employment
decisions.
I. EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH IMMIGRATION LAWS
The IFCO raid in April 2006 kicked off an era of "more aggressive
federal crackdown on employers" for immigration violations.39 Previously,
employers were relatively unbothered by immigration enforcement actions,
in part due to political pressures employers exacted on their congressional
39. Lipton, supra note 12. Just five days before the raid, the former immigration
commissioner, Doris Meissner, called the lack of enforcement action against employers a
"hypocrisy." Steven Greenhouse, Going After Migrants, but Not Employers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16,2006, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3.
An aggressive law enforcement push to arrest undocumented workers at worksites raises
ancillary concerns about DHS plans to shelter and care for detained workers. In 2006, ICE
awarded a $385 million contract to Kellogg Brown & Root ("KBR") to provide temporary
immigration detention centers in the event there is a large influx of immigrants into the United
States. Rachel L. Swains, Halliburton Subsidiary Gets Contract To Add Temporary Immigration
Detention Centers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006, at A7. Although ICE does not intend to use the
KBR contract as a vehicle to provide housing for detained immigrants in routine deportation
proceedings, DHS confirmed its plans to increase bed space for detained immigrants more
generally. Id.
The T. Don Hutto Family Detention Center, located near Austin, Texas, is an example of
a facility recently constructed to hold immigrants not authorized to enter the United States.
Despite the fact that it aims to provide a facility that allows family units to remain intact during
deportation proceedings, critics describe it as " 'Draconian,' " Ralph Blumenthal, U.S. Gives Tour
of Family Detention Center that Critics Liken to a Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2007, at A9
(quoting ACLU lawyer Vanita Gupta), and "prisonlike," id. DHS, however, must maintain
proper oversight of contractors who provide detention services for immigration officials, as
evidenced by a recent $2.5 million settlement between one such contractor and 1,600 immigrants
who alleged they were abused while detained at the facility. See John Sullivan, Settlement for
Abused Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at B8. A recent audit of five of the government's
approximately 325 detention centers unveiled a shocking assortment of violations of government
standards for healthcare, housing, and the provision of legal services. Rachel Swarns, Immigrant
Centers Inspected, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, at A17.
2008]
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representatives.4" Indeed, the number of immigration agents dedicated to
workplace enforcement operations fell from 240 in 1999 to just sixty-five
in 2004.4' In contrast to the relatively lax enforcement actions against
employers in the early 2000s, fiscal year 2007 saw a record number of
worksite enforcement actions that resulted in 863 arrests for suspected
criminal violations.42 In addition to increasing both the number of agents
and worksite enforcements, DHS turned up the heat on employers by
replacing administrative fines with criminal charges and asset seizures as
the department's preferred enforcement mechanisms.43
Employers must also navigate a policy shift within DHS regarding
employers who commit themselves to honest, compliance-minded
employment verification policies. DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff has
previously indicated the department's position that a company that "[does]
the right thing" by maintaining a system of internal controls' and
voluntarily "cooperating in 'good faith' " with the government will not be
the subject of immigration charges for hiring undocumented workers.45 In
truth, the current government policy recognizing the honest compliance
efforts of employers is far from clear-cut: by Secretary Chertoff s own
words, the government is "not in the business of doing amnesty" simply
because companies seek to cooperate with the government in enforcing
immigration laws.46
40. See Greenhouse, supra note 39 (explaining that attempts at effective enforcement were
undercut by congressional pressures not to "antagonize business"). Texas Representative Lavar
Smith attributed lax enforcement to "a lack of political will." Id.
41. Id. In 2006, ICE applied for funding to support 171 new enforcement agents, which
would increase the number of agents dedicated to worksite enforcement by approximately fifty
percent. See DHS Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration Practices, supra note 11, at 4; Lipton,
supra note 12 (noting the proposed 171 agents would be added to the existing 325 agents).
42. Fact Sheet, ICE, Worksite Enforcement (Oct. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Fact Sheet, ICE],
available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/worksite.htm. There were only twenty-five
criminal arrests in 2002. Id.
43. See DHS Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration Practices, supra note 11, at 4 (quoting
DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, who called the renewed focus on employers a" 'strategic shift'
in enforcement").
ICE began relying more heavily on "significant criminal charges" after discovering that
the comparatively minor administrative penalties did not effectively deter violations. ICE, Safe-
Harbor FAQs, Will ICE Attempt To Criminally Prosecute Employers Engaged in the Practice of
Hiring Illegal Workers?, http://faq.ice.gov/cgi-bin/ice-faq.cfg/php/enduser/std alp.php?p-sid
=RRkNJOKi (search by Answer ID 94) (last visited Dec. 5, 2007). Despite the shift to criminal
penalties, monetary penalties remain an integral part of ICE's worksite enforcement mission. In
the first three quarters of fiscal year 2007, ICE collected over $30 million in "criminal fines,
restitutions, and civil judgments" arising from worksite enforcement actions. Fact Sheet, ICE,
supra note 42.
44. Editorial, supra note 2.
45. Solis & Reddy, supra note 3 (reporting the assurance DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff
gave regarding employers who cooperate in a government-sponsored verification program).
46. Reddy, supra note 8.
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Swift's experience in striving for compliance with immigration laws is
particularly telling of the unavoidable difficulties that employers face in
policing their workers' eligibility for employment. For nearly ten years
prior to the 2006 raid, the company participated in the Basic Pilot Program,
a voluntary government program designed to aid employers in verifying
employment documents." In 2001, however, the Department of Justice
stymied the company's compliance efforts by alleging that Swift
discriminated against undocumented workers by exploring too deeply into
applicants' backgrounds.4 The Department of Justice brought suit for $2.5
million, and Swift agreed to settle the dispute "for less [than] $200,000
with no admission of wrong doing.""
In the months leading up to the raids, Swift management desperately
sought to avoid an on-site enforcement action by forming a partnership
with government immigration agents, conducting their own internal
investigations into employee documentation, and unsuccessfully petitioning
a federal court for an injunction against a potential on-site enforcement
action.50 In the days prior to the raid, the government purportedly ordered
Swift to cease interviews it was conducting with employees to verify their
work authorization status.51 Swift management testified before Congress
that they found it "particularly galling.., that an employer who played by
all the rules and used the only available government tool to screen
employee eligibility[, Basic Pilot,] would be subjected to adversarial
treatment by our government.
'5 2
47. Id. The Basic Pilot Program is only able to verify that stated names match the SSNs
provided by the employee; it is simply not able to detect employees who provide matching names
and SSNs that have been stolen via identity theft. Secretary Chertoff describes the anomaly using
the analogy that "a polio vaccine protects you against polio, [but] it doesn't protect you against
tetanus." Press Release, DHS, Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Assistant Secretary Julie Myers, and Federal Trade
Commission Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras at a Press Conference on Operation Wagon Train
(Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr._1166047951514.shtm; see
also High-Tech Methods, New Rules, Needed for Employment Verification, HR Groups Say,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at A-2 (Mar. 8, 2007) (criticizing Basic Pilot for its inability to
uncover identity theft by many of the undocumented workers at Swift).
48. See Preston, supra note 1.
49. Press Release, Swift & Co., Testimony by John W. (Jack) Shandley, Senior Vice
President, Human Resources, Before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship,
Refugees, Border Security, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary (Apr. 24,
2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
50. Preston, supra note 13 (describing Swift's efforts to avoid a raid).
51. Id.; see Press Release, Swift & Co., supra note 49 ("All attempts to generate a
collaborative solution were repeatedly rebuffed by ICE under the guise of an 'ongoing criminal
investigation.' ").
52. Press Release, Swift & Co., supra note 49.
20081
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The Swift experience demonstrates that employers who utilize
rigorous strategies to police their own workers in order to achieve
compliance with immigration laws are unlikely to avoid crippling
government enforcement actions if they are unsuccessful. It also
demonstrates that employers may not have the capability to correct
immigration violations, despite reasonable efforts, through internal
employment controls. Employers, then, confront a frustrating lose-lose
scenario in responding to the presence of unauthorized workers. On one
hand, they may disclose suspected violations, fully cooperate with the
government, actively seek to correct employment violations, and still face
the risk that ICE will conduct a massive workplace raid despite their good
faith attempts at compliance. Alternatively, employers may attempt to
downplay suspected violations and thereby trigger the full wrath of DHS
enforcement, which includes criminal sanctions against both management
and non-management employees."
II. CURRENT TREATMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION No-
MATCH LETTERS
The SSA and antidiscrimination laws both caution strongly against
using the SSA no-match letter as the basis for an adverse employment
decision. Employers who terminate on account of a no-match letter risk
discharging employees who are, in fact, authorized to work in the United
States. Wrongfully terminated employees may then unleash "an onslaught
of employment law actions" against the employer, including discrimination
suits.54 In addition, employers who terminate on the basis of a no-match
letter may face extra-legal problems such as backlash from employees,
decreased morale, and absenteeism.
The SSA itself warns employers against terminating employees on the
basis of the letter. The no-match letter explicitly counsels the employer
that it "should not use this letter alone to take any adverse action against an
employee."55  The letter warns that taking action could trigger liability
under state and federal law, and it cautions the employer to seek corrections
from employees in a "uniform[]" manner. 6  Notably, the SSA
53. See Lipton, supra note 12 (noting DHS's pledge to " 'break the back' " of organizations
that contribute to the "hiring of millions of illegal workers" (quoting DHS Secretary Michael
Chertoff)).
54. Paul R. Penny, I1, Fire First and Ask Questions Later: What Is the Effect of the Social
Security Administration's "Mismatch Letters?," 5 SCHOLAR 355, 366 (2003).




communicates to the employer that the no-match letter "does [not], by
itself, make any statement about an employee's immigration status."57
One reason the no-match letter counsels employers not to terminate on
the sole basis of the letter is that an employer who terminates an authorized
employee because of a no-match letter risks suit for discrimination. Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196458 ('"Title VII"), employers are
forbidden from discharging employees on the basis of "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."59 In the no-match letter context, an employee who
was terminated at the conclusion of the safe-harbor procedure may allege
that the termination constitutes unlawful discrimination based on one of
Title VII's protected classes. In addition, Title VII protects workers who
have alleged discrimination or participated in an investigation of alleged
discrimination from retaliation.6' An employee who is terminated under
the safe-harbor rule may allege that the termination constituted unlawful
retaliation for activity protected by the statute. Title VII also covers
pretextual employment actions in which the employer falsely claims a
57. Id. at 1.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
59. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Undocumented workers may take advantage of Title VII's protections
even though the statute does not protect discrimination based on alienage, which is a person's
status as a non-citizen. See, e.g., Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir.
1998) (denying an undocumented worker access to Title VII antidiscrimination remedies because
the theory of discrimination was a failure to hire based on alienage); EEOC v. Tortilleria "La
Mejor," 758 F. Supp. 585, 590-91 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that Congress intended Title VII to
apply to undocumented aliens employed in the United States); EEOC, DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL
No. 915.003, § 13: NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION (2002), available at http://eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/national-origin.html ("While federal law prohibits employers from employing
individuals lacking work authorization, employers who nonetheless employ undocumented
workers are prohibited from discriminating against those workers."). Rather than claim
discrimination based on alienage, undocumented workers may allege discrimination on one of the
other protected classes, such as national origin, race, or sex. See Tortilleria "La Mejor," 758 F.
Supp. at 589-90.
However, undocumented workers may be generally deterred from bringing Title VII
claims out of fear that the employer will retaliate against them by both terminating them and
drawing the attention of immigration officials to their undocumented status. See MARION G.
CRAIN, PAULINE T. KIM & MICHAEL SELMI, WORKLAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 653 (2005)
(citing Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004)); Christopher Ho & Jennifer
Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for
Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 473, 492 (2005) (noting that the risk employees face of retaliatory reporting to
immigration officials results in a chilling effect on the enforcement of workers' rights).
Another source of deterrence is the lack of relief that is available to undocumented
workers under the statute. Title VII remedies are typically equitable in nature, and they include
reinstatement, hiring, backpay, and injunctions against continuing violations. Egbuna, 153 F.3d
at 186-87. However, under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Egbuna, an employee who is not
work-eligible may not be awarded remedies when doing so would conflict with immigration laws.
See id. at 187.
60. § 2000e-3(a).
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legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action.6'
Pretext could be implicated when an employer claims the legitimate reason
for firing is the no-match letter, but a court finds the actual motivation is
discriminatory.
Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc. 62 is an example of a Title VII
discrimination case arising from an employer's attempt to verify an
employee's work eligibility. In Zamora, the employer discovered
discrepancies with a group of its employees' SSNs and required the
employees to verify their employment eligibility.63 Though many of the
employees responded by quitting, the plaintiff sought to correct the
discrepancy in order to clarify that he was, in fact, work-eligible. 4 Zamora
obtained confirmation from the SSA that he was eligible to work, but he
demanded an apology from his employer "before [he] could consider
returning to work. ' 65  After the employer terminated him, he filed suit
under Title VII for discrimination based on race and national origin.
66
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit initially reversed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment for the employer, allowing the case to
proceed.67 Later, the en banc court vacated the panel's decision and
affirmed summary judgment for the employer.68 The en banc opinion
began by assuming that the district court was correct in concluding that
Zamora alleged a prima facie case of discrimination arising from his
termination.69 The appellate court, however, found that the employer met
its "exceedingly light" burden to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the discharge-that Zamora demanded an apology and the
employer would not provide one.7' A Title VII cause of action alleging
pretext then requires the employee to present evidence that the employer's
stated justification was a pretext for discrimination. 7' Because Zamora
61. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Bd. of Trs., 928 F. 2d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that an
employer discriminated against a Hispanic employee, and that its stated reason for discharge, the
employee's unsatisfactory job performance, was pretextual).
62. 478 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
63. Id. at 1163.
64. Id. at 1163-64.
65. Id. at 1164.
66. Id.
67. Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 449 F.3d 1106, 1115, 1117 (10th Cir. 2006), vacated en
banc, 478 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
68. Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
69. Id. at 1165.
70. Id. at 1165-66.
71. Id. (referencing the burden-shifting scheme established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
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failed to meet this burden, the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment
for the employer.72
In the Federal Register commentary preceding the safe-harbor rule,
ICE dismissed the idea that Zamora conflicted with the safe-harbor
procedure.73 However, the commentary does not evaluate the risk of Title
VII liability that was raised in Zamora.74 Instead, the commentary simply
states that "[tihe rule does not impose upon employers any new
responsibilities that do not already exist under current law."" While it is
true that the safe-harbor rule does not change an employer's obligation
under Title VII, the commentary fails to recognize that compliance is made
more difficult as employers must navigate their responsibilities under both
the rule and existing antidiscrimination laws with little government
guidance on how to balance these two potentially conflicting interests.
Critics of the safe-harbor rule read the Tenth Circuit's panel decision
in Zamora as evidence that employers who terminate because of SSN
discrepancies are likely to risk discrimination allegations. As the critics
have realized, similar cases might arise under facts less favorable to the
employer. In Zamora, the employee's demand for an apology provided the
employer with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to terminate the
employee. A second component of Zamora is also noteworthy: the
employee alleged discrimination based on the fact that he was suspended
for failing to present documentation of his work eligibility status.76 On
rehearing, the en banc Tenth Circuit divided evenly on the question of
whether the suspension raised sufficient evidence of discrimination.77 As a
result, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.78
However, a different court may vote differently and permit a similar case to
proceed. Thus, employers should not readily dismiss Zamora as ICE urges
in the Federal Register.79 Instead, they should recognize that the Tenth
Circuit decided Zamora on its own unique facts, and the case does not
represent a wholesale approval of any particular course of action in
response to a no-match letter.
72. Id. at 1167.
73. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg.
45,611,45,620 (Aug. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a).
74. Id. at 45,620-21 (discussing conflict with the INA antidiscrimination provision, not Title
VIl).
75. Id. at 45,621. The commentary also dismisses judicial discussions of INA liability as
simply "dicta." Id. at 45,620-21.
76. Zamora, 478 F.3d at 1164-65.
77. id. at 1165.
78. Id.
79. See Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 45,620.
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Fears that employers facing liability for employing undocumented
workers would be given an incentive to discriminate against documented
aliens and U.S. citizens in their compliance efforts prompted Congress to
provide an additional antidiscrimination provision.8' The INA prohibits an
employer from discriminating against an individual with respect to hiring,
recruitment, or discharge because of the individual's citizenship status or
national origin.8' The INA antidiscrimination statute applies to citizens and
nationals of the United States and to aliens lawfully admitted for residence
or granted asylum. Notably, it does not apply to unauthorized aliens, nor to
some cases in which the alleged discrimination is covered by Title VII.
82
A recent case illuminates an employer's obligations under the INA
antidiscrimination provision. In Incalza v. Fendi North America, Inc.,83 the
Ninth Circuit upheld a $1 million jury award to a Fendi store manager
whose visa had expired at the time the company terminated him.' 4 The
employer argued that the INA permitted it to terminate the plaintiff because
his work authorization status had lapsed. 5 The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
finding the INA provided a remedy short of termination-suspension or
unpaid leave until the employee resolves the eligibility lapse-and that the
employer used the employee's eligibility status as a pretext for unlawful
termination.86
80. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 12-13 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757,
5762; Linda Sue Johnson, Comment, The Antidiscrimination Provision of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1059, 1071 (1988). Congress thought the INA
antidiscrimination provision was necessary to protect lawfully admitted aliens:
The Committee does not believe barriers should be placed in the path of permanent
residents and other aliens who are authorized to work and who are seeking employment
.... It makes no sense to admit immigrants and refugees to this country, require them
to work and then allow employers to refuse to hire them because of their immigration
(non-citizenship) status.
H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 12-13, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5762.
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(l) (2000). The Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA") of
1986 amended the INA. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000)).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(l)-(2)(B). "Unauthorized alien" includes aliens who are not
"lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or... authorized [to work]." Id. § 1324a(h)(3). The
INA prohibits discrimination by employers with more than three employees. Id.
§ 1324b(a)(2)(A). In addition, the INA antidiscrimination provision cannot be used in
conjunction with the Title VII remedy; only one charge may be filed on facts that give rise to
liability under both statutes. Id. § 1324b(b)(2).
83. 479 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2007).
84. Id. at 1014.
85. Id. at 1009.
86. Id. at 1013-14.
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Incalza demonstrates the strength of the NA antidiscrimination
provision, especially in the case of an employee who was legally
authorized to work at the time of hire but whose documentation later
expired. The court's ruling in Incalza sends a message to employers that
although the NA antidiscrimination provision does not explicitly protect
aliens who were unauthorized to work at the time of the discriminatory
action, it does protect aliens who were at one time lawfully authorized to
work.87 Thus, in the context of a no-match letter, a question of
discrimination liability will arise for employers who terminate work-
ineligible employees who were at one time lawfully admitted to the United
States.88
In addition to potential liability for discrimination under Title VII and
the INA, employers invite extra-legal problems by terminating employees
based on a no-match letter. Employers who terminate employees,
regardless of the terminated employees' status as authorized or
87. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3).
88. In addition to the federal antidiscrimination provisions, a terminated employee may
allege that the employer violated labor laws by using the no-match letter as pretext for its
underlying motive to stifle unionization campaigns or other union activity. Section 8 of the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000), prohibits employers from
engaging in unfair labor practices and protects employees who exercise their right to support
unionization, § 158(a); see also NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1962)
(recognizing that non-unionized employees have rights under the NLRA).
The NLRA gives little practical protection to undocumented workers. Yungsuhn Park,
The Immigrant Workers Union: Challenges Facing Low-Wage Immigrant Workers in Los
Angeles, 12 ASIAN L.J. 67, 85 (2005). The landmark case Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883
(1984), significantly curtailed remedies available to unauthorized workers when it held that
undocumented workers were not eligible for reinstatement because reinstatement conflicts with
the national immigration policies set forth in the INA. Id. at 899. The Supreme Court further
undercut the remedies available to undocumented workers in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), which held that undocumented workers are not eligible for backpay
under the NLRA. Id. at 151. As a result of their lack of remedial measures, undocumented
immigrants have almost no practical legal recourse to challenge unfair labor practices, and
attorneys are disincentivized from bringing lawsuits on their behalf under the NLRA. Park,
supra, at 85.
Unions were among the first challengers to the ICE safe-harbor rule. The AFL-CIO filed
a suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California just two weeks
after ICE finalized the rule; the federation successfully petitioned Judge Maxine Chesney for a
temporary restraining order to prevent the rule from taking effect. See Temporary Restraining
Order and Order To Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction at 1, AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, C07-
4472 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The AFL-CIO
argued that the safe-harbor rule would facilitate the use of no-match letters as a" 'union busting
tool.' " Peter Prengaman, AFL-CIO Sues Government over Planned Crackdown on Illegal
Workers, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 29, 2007, at A12 (quoting an AFL-CIO attorney). Notably, unions
have benefited substantially from the influx of immigrant labor in the last decade, finding
immigrant workers contributed to an increase in their membership in the face of declining native-
born membership. From 1996 to 2006, immigrant participation in unions increased thirty percent.
Posting of James Parks to AFL-CIO Weblog, http://blog.aflcio.org/2007/08/30/immigrant-union-
membership-grew-30-percent-in-last-decade/ (Aug. 30, 2007).
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unauthorized workers, face the risk that the remaining employees will
protest the termination policy.89 Their protests may cause economic
disruption. One example of such a protest occurred when over five
hundred employees at a North Carolina pork processing facility staged a
walkout after the company terminated about fifty workers whom
management suspected of providing false SSNs during the hiring process."
The protest was both significant and unusual given the fact that the plant
was not unionized.91
Another extra-legal problem arises after employers terminate
unauthorized workers or when federal officials raid a worksite: any
remaining immigrants who are not in the United States legally may go into
hiding and disappear from schools, work, and the community in general.9
At minimum, then, employees may respond by communicating their mutual
disagreement with the employer's policy by organizing economically
disruptive protests. At its worst, backlash may cause a mass exodus of
labor sources from local communities. 93 Thus, the realistic threat of
employment discrimination claims and the extra-legal problems triggered
by terminations and raids both reinforce the cautionary language in the
SSA no-match letter that an employer "should not use this letter alone to
take any adverse action against an employee." 94
Ill. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT SAFE-HARBOR RULE
Employers seeking to minimize their risk of discrimination suits and
extra-legal problems arising from their response to no-match letters must
also balance the risk of government enforcement actions for immigration
violations. The ICE rule does not relieve employers of this balancing act;
indeed, the ICE rule further jeopardizes Secretary Chertoff s assurances
that employers who cooperate with the government will not face sanctions
for immigration violations.95 The most revolutionary aspect of the rule is
that it modifies the NA definition of "knowing" with respect to whether an
employer has knowingly employed a person not authorized to work in the
89. Julia Preston, Immigration Raid Draws Protest from Labor Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2007, at A17.
90. Id.
91. Id. Although the plant is not unionized, there has been an active union campaign at the
plant for several years. Id.
92. See Nina Bernstein, Immigrants Panicked by Rumors of Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2006, at B I (noting rumors have the effect of potentially "paralyz[ing]" immigrant communities).
93. See Morales, supra note 6.
94. SSA No-Match Letter, supra note 25, at 2.
95. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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United States.96 The regulations promulgated under the INA provide that
knowledge may be found in two ways. First, an employer may have actual
knowledge that an employee is not eligible to work. Second, constructive
knowledge may be attributed to the employer based on a consideration of
how a reasonable employer would view the totality of circumstances
surrounding the question of whether a person is work-eligible.97 The rule
adds receipt of an SSA no-match letter to a list of example factors that
DHS may consider in a "totality of the relevant circumstances" inquiry into
whether an employer has constructive knowledge of immigration
violations.98
The heart of the rule, as indicated by its title, establishes a safe-harbor
procedure under immigration law for employers to follow if they receive a
no-match letter from the SSA.9 The rule is intended to address widespread
employer concern about whether the no-match letter should be viewed as a
red flag that a particular employee is unauthorized to work in the United
States"° despite the letter's assurance that it "does [not], by itself, make
any statement about an employee's immigration status."' 1 If the employer
follows the safe-harbor procedure, ICE will not consider the no-match
letter in its calculus of whether the employer knowingly hired unauthorized
workers in violation of the INA."°2 However, the safe-harbor procedure
places the ultimate burden on employers to terminate employees who they
suspect, based on the outcome of the safe-harbor procedure, are not eligible
to work in the United States.0 3
The safe-harbor procedure is a suggested course of action for
employers to follow upon receipt of a no-match letter from the SSA. The
96. See Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. 45,611,45,620 (Aug. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a).
97. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(1)(1) (2007); see Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561, 566-67 (9th
Cir. 1989) (holding that an employer, despite lacking actual knowledge, satisfied the scienter
requirement of the INA because he received notice that his employees were unauthorized but
failed to investigate or "take appropriate corrective action").
98. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at
45,612-13.
99. Id. at 45,612.
100. See Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 71 Fed.
Reg. 34,281, 34,282 (June 14, 2006) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a) ("[The no-match] letter
may be one of the only indicators to an employer that one of its employees may be an
unauthorized alien.").
101. SSA No-Match Letter, supra note 25, at I. The SSA no-match letter is not a tool for
immigration enforcement, and the letter itself warns against using the no-match letter as
justification for terminating employees. See infra Part IV.A.
102. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at
45,613.
103. See id. (requiring the employer to "choose between" terminating the employee or risking
a finding of constructive knowledge under the INA).
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first step of the safe-harbor procedure requires the employer to "promptly"
evaluate whether the SSA error resulted from a clerical error in its own
records." If the employer finds the source of the error in its own files, it
should contact the SSA, correct its own records, and then contact the
agency again to verify the error has been cured.0 5 The rule considers a
"reasonable employer to have acted promptly if the employer [completes
these] steps within thirty days" of receiving the SSA letter. 106
If the employer is not able to resolve the mismatch by curing a clerical
error in its own records, it proceeds to the second step of the safe-harbor
procedure. In the second step, the employer approaches the employee
directly to determine if the employer's records are accurate. 0 7  If the
employer discovers inaccuracies in its own recordkeeping, it must correct
the records, inform the SSA, and verify with the agency that the stated
name now matches the stated SSN. °'0 If, on the other hand, the employee
verifies that the employer's records are correct, then the employer must ask
the employee to resolve the matter directly with SSA. °9 The employer
must give the employee the date that it received the no-match letter and
"advise the employee to resolve the discrepancy with the [SSA] within
ninety days of [that] date."" 0
Finally, if the first two steps of the safe-harbor procedure do not
resolve the discrepancy within ninety days, the employer is provided with
an additional three days to embark on a "reasonable verification procedure"
of the employee's work authorization status."' The rule gives one example
of such a procedure, which consists of completing a new 1-9 form without
104. Id.
105. Id. The employer would contact either the SSA or DHS, depending on the source of the
no-match letter. The rule addresses no-match letters from (1) the SSA resulting from W-2 errors,
and (2) ICE indicating that 1-9 information is in error. See supra note 19. The following
summary of the rule and this Comment will address only the SSA no-match letter.
106. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at
45,613. The standard is whether the employer has acted reasonably and with promptness, though
it is not clear from the rule whether the examination of constructive knowledge under the totality
of the circumstances permits deviation from the thirty-day time period given in the rule. See id.
(denoting simply that a "reasonable employer [would] check[] its records promptly" and that
thirty days is considered prompt).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The employee might contact the local SSA office and offer proper documentation of
identity and documents that address the error, such as name change documents. Id.
110. Id. at 45,624. The ninety days for the second step is not in addition to the thirty days for
the first step; that is, the employer has ninety days to institute the first two steps. See id. at 45,617
(reiterating the timetable under the final rule).
11. Id. at 45,613.
[Vol. 86
NO-MATCH LETTERS
the aid of the suspect SSN." 2 If the employer continues to provide work
for an employee who cannot successfully complete the secondary
verification procedure, then DHS may consider the receipt of the no-match
letter as a factor indicating that the employer had constructive knowledge
that it employed undocumented workers in violation of the INA."3 The
comments to the rule state that the "employer must choose between: (1)
Taking action to terminate the employee, or (2) Facing the risk that DHS
may find the employer had constructive knowledge that the employee was
an unauthorized alien" and thereby violated the INA by continuing to
provide employment. 4 Thus, the safe-harbor procedure effectively ends




A. The Social Security Administration Is Separate and Distinct from
Immigration Enforcement
A brief summary of SSA accounting informs the analysis of whether
no-match letters are an appropriate tool for immigration enforcement.
Employers report wages to the SSA using the Wage and Tax Statement,
known as the W-2 Form.116 In addition to reporting wage data to the
Internal Revenue Service, the SSA uses the W-2 Form to calculate
retirement, survivor, and disability benefits." 7 In the absence of correct
accounting, employee retirement benefits may be miscalculated or not paid
at all." 8
The SSA processes 235 million W-2s each year, ten percent of which
have mismatched name and SSN combinations. "9 The agency then applies
112. Id. Identity must be established using a document with a photograph. Id. The INA
allots three business days for an employer to verify the employment eligibility of a new hire. See
8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(l)(ii) (2007). The completion of an 1-9 at this stage of the safe-harbor
procedure will be referred to as the secondary 1-9 procedure.
113. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at
45,613.
114. Id.
115. But see id. at 45,621 ("The firing of any employee ... because of the receipt of a no-
match letter is speculative, and is neither required by nor a logical result of the rule being
adopted.").
116. See SSA No-Match Letter, supra note 25, at 1; Is the Federal Government Doing All It
Can To Stem the Tide of Illegal Immigration?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory
Affairs of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Testimony]
(testimony of Martin H. Gerry, Deputy Comm'r, SSA).
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specialized computer programming to remove many of the clerical errors,
and the remaining mismatches are transferred to an Earnings Suspense File
("ESF') pending resolution of the mismatch and proper crediting to a
taxpayer's record. 2° The taxes due on the mismatched wage reports are
paid into the Social Security Trust Fund.' 2' The SSA then seeks to resolve
further discrepancies through notification to employers via the no-match
letter. "'22 The administration planned to issue 140,000 no-match letters in
2007.123 The no-match letter informs the employer that its sole function is
to correct social security records: the letter clearly explains that it does not
"make any statement about an employee's immigration status."'' 24
In contrast to the W-2, the Employment Eligibility Verification Form,
known as Form 1-9, is the principal tool used to verify that an employee is
authorized to work in the United States. 25 The Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 198626 ("IRCA") requires that employers verify the
employment eligibility of all new hires using the I-9.127 Like the W-2, the
1-9 collects data on the worker's name and SSN. Unlike the W-2, however,
the 1-9 also collects information on documents that employees offer to
verify employment eligibility. 28 Because it calls for an inspection of work
authorization documents, the 1-9, not the W-2, is best suited to verifying
employment eligibility.
Current ICE procedures recognize the 1-9 as the principal work
eligibility document: during DHS audits, ICE investigators examine the I-
120. Id. Since its inception in 1937 through 2003 (the most recent year for which data
regarding the ESF is available), 255 million W-2 reports have accumulated in the ESF. Id.
121. Id. $7.2 billion was paid into the trust fund for tax year 2003, which amounts to
approximately 1.3% of all taxes paid into the Social Security Trust Fund. Id. Since taxes on
earnings in the ESF are paid into the social security coffers, the need to resolve the mismatches is
driven by the need to properly credit taxpayers, not the financial concern for the stability of the
social security system. See id. Although the SSA currently is authorized to use taxpayer data for
the limited purpose of verifying eligibility for social security benefits, the administration does
"[support] allowing disclosure of [W-2] data in the interests of national security and for law
enforcement purposes." Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
122. Testimony, supra note 116. The SSA only sends no-match letters to employers who
submit more than ten W-2s to the administration and for whom the proportion of mismatches is
more than 0.5%. Id. The no-match letter may include as many as five hundred SSNs, but the
corresponding names are deleted in an effort to protect privacy. Id.
123. Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 36, at 6.
124. SSA No-Match Letter, supra note 25, at 1.
125. MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF IMMIGRATION 35 (2d ed. 2000).
126. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000).
127. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION EMPLOYMENT
COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK § 2-1 (1997 ed.).
128. See Form 1-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, DHS, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs. I (June 5, 2007), available at http://www.formi9.com/i-9.pdf.
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9s kept on file by the employer.' 29  If immigration status documents or
employment authorization documents recorded on the 1-9 do not match ICE
records, the bureau will alert the employer in a DHS no-match letter that is
similar to the SSA no-match letter. 30 The United States Department of
Justice also recognizes the 1-9 as the main work eligibility tool: the
department directs employers to the 1-9, not documents relating to SSA
wage reports, to achieve compliance with immigration laws.' 3 '
Although the W-2 is an accounting tool for social security benefits and
the 1-9 is an employment authorization tool, the ICE rule applies the same
safe-harbor procedure to both the SSA no-match letter and the DHS no-
match letter that results from ICE audits. 32 This rather curious outcome
represents a significant departure from the justification that SSA provides
for the no-match letter program-to properly record wages for the benefit
of the employee.'33 In fact, the SSA states clearly in the no-match letter
that an employer
should not use [an SSA no-match] letter ... to take any adverse
action against an employee, such as laying off, suspending, firing, or
discriminating against that individual, just because his or her Social
Security number appears on the list. Doing so could, in fact, violate
State or Federal law and subject [the employer] to legal
consequences. '34
Under the ICE rule, the no-match letter not only suggests a lawful
basis for terminating an employee, but it also implicitly encourages the
129. See Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. 45,611,45,612 (Aug. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a).
130. Id. The letter is called a "Notice of Suspect Documents." Id.
131. See U.S. DOJ, Civil Rights Div., Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related
Unfair Employment Practices, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), How Can Employers Verify
Their Employees' Employment Eligibility in a Non-Discriminatory Manner?, http://www.usdoj.
gov/crt/osc/htmlfacts.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2007) ("Employers can demonstrate compliance
with the law by following the verification (1-9 Form) requirements and treating all new
employees the same."); see also Comment, Low-Wage Immigrant Worker Coalition 18 (Aug. 14,
2006), available at http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/SSA-NM Toolkit/SSAnomatch-long
comments_2006-8-14.pdf (projecting that "established federal guidance on no-match letters [will
be turned] on its head" when the rule takes effect).
132. See Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 45,611 ("The amended regulation describes the legal obligations of an employer, under
current immigration law, when the employer receives a no-match letter from the Social Security
Administration .... ); supra note 19 (explaining that the ICE safe-harbor rule applies the same
procedure to both the DHS and SSA no-match letters).
133. SSA No-Match Letter, supra note 25, at I (calling for the employer to correct
mismatched names and SSNs so that an "employee may... get benefits he or she is due").
134. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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termination by threatening a finding of constructive knowledge. 3 ' This
phenomenon, while laudable as an effort to increase intragovernmental
cooperation and efficiency, has the unintended effect of subjecting
compliance-minded employers to discrimination liability.
B. The Risk of Terminating a Lawful Employee on the Basis of a No-
Match Letter Is Potentially Great
The risk of terminating a lawful employee is surprisingly high given
the number of mismatched SSN and name combinations that employers
submit to the SSA. Approximately ten percent of W-2s submitted to the
SSA contain discrepancies with SSA files.'36 Given the fact that the SSA
processes 235 million W-2s each year, 3 7 the annual number of
discrepancies exceeds twenty-three million, or roughly 3.6 mismatches per
employer.
138
Undoubtedly, some of the mismatches are evidence of taxes collected
from unauthorized workers.'39 However, many errors are, in fact, harmless
because they result from routine name changes undertaken after marriage,
clerical errors such as transposed digits, and perhaps even errors resulting
from the difficulty employers encounter with correctly spelled, but
unfamiliar, ethnic names. 40 Routine computer programming applied to the
SSA mismatch data file relieves about half of the initial mismatches.1
4 1
Over time, the number of false mismatches in the ESF is steadily decreased
through other SSA verification methods, though some errors will inevitably
remain. 14  Although the number of mismatches may fall to a very low
135. See Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 36, at 14 ("It is clear
to this Court that DHS has changed course .... DHS's new position is that an employer who
receives a no-match letter can, without any other evidence of illegality, be held liable under the
continuing employment provision.").
136. Testimony, supra note 116.
137. See id. (citing the 2005 figure).
138. Approximately 6.6 million employers submitted 235 million W-2s, which results in
approximately 3.56 mismatches per employer. See id.
139. The SSA acknowledges that a "major portion of ESF wage items" results from
unauthorized workers. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SSA, EVALUATION REPORT: THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S EARNINGS SUSPENSE FILE TACTICAL PLAN AND EFFORTS
To REDUCE THE FILE'S GROWTH AND SIZE 7 (A-03-97-31003) (2000), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-03-97-31003.pdf.
140. Penny, supra note 54, at 362 & n.38. The SSA applies computer programs to the
discrepancy file in order to attempt to identify clerical errors such as transposed digits, but it
admits that it cannot address common but complex problems using its automated processes.
Testimony, supra note 116; see also Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-
Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,611, 45,612 (Aug. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a)
(identifying clerical errors and name changes as the cause of many mismatches).
141. Testimony, supra note 116.
142. See id. (noting 2.3% of wage items from tax year 1995 remained in the ESF as of 2003).
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percentage of all W-2s filed with the SSA, millions of mismatches may
exist in a given tax year.
143
Despite explicit warnings in the no-match letter to the contrary, many
employers fire employees for whom they receive SSA no-match
notification.' In fact, a survey of over nine hundred employers and their
employees who were the subject of a no-match letter revealed that the
majority of employers discharged the employees for whom they received a
no-match letter.'
45
One reason that employers resort to termination is that they are fearful
of employing undocumented aliens. The termination decision is thus an
effort to avert any potential risk of violating immigration laws.'46
However, nearly sixty percent of the surveyed employers who terminated
the suspect employees failed to conduct further inquiry into the employees'
authorization to work, and about one third of the terminated employees
were not permitted to avoid termination by attempting to resolve the SSA
discrepancy on their own.'47 These findings indicate that many employers
do not heed SSA advice against taking employment action based on the no-
match letter. 1
48
If an employer terminates an employee upon receiving a no-match
letter, it cannot be certain that the posted mismatch was not the result of a
clerical error by either the employer or the SSA. Because a large volume
143. Given the fact that 2.3% of wage items remain in the ESF fund from tax year 1995, and
that there were 235 million W-2s submitted for SSA processing in 1995, there are roughly 5.4
million unresolved wage items. See id.
144. CHIRAG MEHTA ET AL., CENTER FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S NO-MATCH LETrER PROGRAM: IMPLICATIONS FOR
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND WORKERS' RIGHTS 14 (2003) [hereinafter NO-MATCH
PROGRAM], available at http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/SSA-no-match-survey-final-
reportiI 1-20-03.pdf. But see Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match
Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at 45,621 ("The firing of any employee or 'churning' of the workforce
because of the receipt of a no-match letter is speculative, and is neither required by nor a logical
result of the rule being adopted.").
145. NO-MATCH PROGRAM, supra note 144, at 13. Although a small percentage of
employers polled in the survey reinstated the terminated workers at a later date, 2.2% of
employers rehired employees without benefits, and 0.6% of employers rehired the employees but
refused to grant them their previous seniority rank. Id. at 14.
146. Prior to the passage of the IRCA, employers indicated that they would engage in
discriminatory practices in order to "play it safe" with immigration laws. Johnson, supra note 80,
at 1072-73. A similar fear of immigration violations may play into employers' decisions to
terminate on the basis of the no-match letter.
147. NO-MATCH PROGRAM, supra note 144, at 15.
148. See Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 45,621 (acknowledging that "employers in the past have been confused about their
responsibilities ... [resulting] in unwarranted termination of work-authorized individuals"). An
employer's failure to permit an employee to resolve the SSA discrepancy raises the question of
whether the termination constitutes pretext for discrimination. See supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
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of mismatches occur each year, an employer's risk of terminating a
legitimately authorized employee is potentially great. Employers,
therefore, are well-advised to follow the advice in the no-match letter that it
"does [not] make any statement about an employee's immigration status,"
and that the employer "should not use [the] letter alone to take any adverse
action against an employee."'
' 49
C. The Rule Forces an Impossible Choice
The safe-harbor rule is designed to provide "options for avoiding
liability" under the INA for intentional immigration violations. 5 ° In
reality, an employer who cannot resolve the SSA discrepancy "promptly"
will be forced to decide whether to continue to employ the individuals who
are the subjects of no-match letters.'5 ' Evidence indicates that employers
already terminate on the basis of the no-match letter despite warnings
against such action.' 52 The rule's implicit threat to impute knowledge of
INA violations to an employer based on the no-match letter will
undoubtedly incentivize additional terminations.
Employers who seek to avoid INA liability by terminating employees,
however, risk discrimination suits lodged by the terminated employees who
were, in fact, lawfully authorized to work in the United States.'53
Unfortunately for employers, the safe-harbor procedure does not provide an
explicit, parallel safe-harbor under the antidiscrimination provisions of the
INA or Title VII. 5 4 As a result, employers face a nearly impossible choice:
they may either elect to take on the risk of potential discrimination suits, or
they may risk a DHS finding that they had constructive knowledge of
immigration violations under the INA.
The only way for an employer to avoid liability under both
immigration and antidiscrimination laws is to maintain absolute certainty
149. SSA No-Match Letter, supra note 25, at 2; see supra Part H (discussing the potential
risks employers face in using the no-match letter as the basis for adverse employment actions).
150. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at
45,612.
151. Id. at 45,613. While the rule is correct to point out that it "does not impose upon
employers any new responsibilities that do not already exist under current law," id. at 45,621, the
rule fails to acknowledge that it creates "incentives to take actions that violate" antidiscrimination
laws. Letter from Peggy R. Mastroianni, Assoc. Legal Counsel, EEOC, to Richard A. Sloan,
Dir., Regulatory Mgmt. Div., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., DHS (Aug. 14, 2006)
[hereinafter Letter from Peggy R. Mastroianni], available at http:llwww.eeoc.gov/foialletters
/2006/viinational-immigration.html.
152. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
153. See supra Part f.
154. Letter from Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n to Dir., Regulatory Mgmt. Div., U.S.




that it only hires authorized employees and only terminates undocumented
workers. In doing so, it must also maintain a uniform policy in its
interaction with both classes of employees. This solution calls for
employers to exercise a high level of scrutiny of the eligibility status of
their employees.'55 This level of scrutiny is nearly impossible, in part due
to the shortcomings of the government's Basic Pilot Program.'56
The employer's burden is particularly onerous considering that the
INA, in contrast, merely requires employers to demonstrate "good faith
compliance" with the law's mandate to verify employment eligibility
documents. 57 The good faith compliance standard requires the employer to
accept all documents that "reasonably appear on their face to be
genuine.""' In exchange for good faith compliance, the employer enjoys a
rebuttable presumption that it has not knowingly hired an undocumented
worker. 9
Congress adopted the good faith compliance standard in the INA
because it was concerned by how employers would handle their new
employment eligibility verification duties under the act. 6 °  Congress
intended that employers who required assistance in verifying documents
would call upon the INS to verify eligibility. Congress did not intend for
the employer to elicit additional documentation from the prospective
employee.' 6' In fact, the INA specifically prohibits the employer from
asking for "more or different documents ... or refusing to honor
documents tendered that ... reasonably appear to be genuine."'' 6  The
practice of refusing documents that would appear valid to a reasonable
employer is prohibited as discriminatory document abuse. 63 Thus, the law
does not require employers to be as savvy as the government in verifying
155. Employers complain that current technology available to them, including the Basic Pilot
Program that Swift utilized, is insufficient to accurately verify worker eligibility status. The
Human Resource Initiative for a Legal Workforce called for a complete overhaul of the current
eligibility verification system, in part due to the "administrative burden on private employers" the
current system imposes. In addition, the initiative is concerned about the balance that employers
must strike between accurately verifying documents and avoiding liability for discrimination.
High-Tech Methods, New Rules, Needed for Employment Verification, HR Groups Say, supra
note 47.
156. Press Release, Swift & Co., supra note 49; see also supra note 47 (discussing the Basic
Pilot Program).




160. AILA Letter, supra note 154, at I1.
161. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 61-62, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5665-66.
162. Immigration and Nationality Act § 274B(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6) (2000).
163. See AILA Letter, supra note 154, at 12.
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proffered documents." The prohibition on document abuse requires an
employer to exercise extreme caution in its diligent efforts to verify the
validity of employment authorization documents.
65
The ICE rule addresses the potential for discriminatory document
abuse that may arise during the course of the safe-harbor procedure. Under
the rule, employees who are the subject of a no-match letter are prohibited
from using their suspect SSN in the secondary 1-9 verification procedure,
which is the final step in the safe-harbor procedure.166 At first glance, the
mandate that the employer require different or additional documents in the
secondary verification procedure seems to conflict with the INA
prohibition on document abuse. 167 However, the INA verbiage prohibiting
document abuse is repeated at the end of the safe-harbor rule in order to
indicate that the secondary verification procedure would not be considered
document abuse. 1
68
The comments to the safe-harbor rule purport that "employers who
follow the safe-harbor procedures set forth in [the] rule uniformly and
without regard to perceived national origin or citizenship status as
required by ... the INA will not be found to have engaged in unlawful
discrimination."'169 ICE guidance mailed with the SSA no-match letter will
also reiterate the language in the final rule regarding an employer's lack of
liability for INA discrimination under the safe-harbor procedure. 170  The
guidance states that employers who follow the safe-harbor procedure in a
uniform manner, with the result that employees for whom the employer
164. See Collins Foods Int'l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating
"Congress carefully crafted section 1324a to limit the burden and the risk placed on employers"
in the verification process).
165. Swift was unable to meet this burden. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text
(outlining the Department of Justice action against Swift).
166. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg.
45,611, 45,613 (Aug. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a). The amended regulations
promulgated under the INA will state that "[n]o document containing the SSN ... that is the
subject of the no-match letter ... may be used to establish employment authorization or identity
or both." Id.
167. See AILA Letter, supra note 154, at 13.
168. See Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 45,624 ("Nothing in this definition should be interpreted as permitting an employer to
request more or different documents than are required under section 274A(b) of the [INA] or to
refuse to honor documents tendered that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine and to
relate to the individual."); see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 274B(a)(6), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324b(a)(6) (2000).
169. Safe Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at
45,613-14 (emphasis added). The commentary cites the rule's clarification that an employer
must refuse to accept the suspect SSN in the secondary verification procedure that takes place if
the mismatch is not resolved after ninety days. See id. at 45,614.
170. ICE, ICE Employer Guidance Insert Letter 2, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/employer/
ICEinsert.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2007).
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cannot verify employment eligibility are terminated, will not face charges
brought by the United States under the antidiscrimination provision of the
INA.1
7 1
There are several problems with ICE's assurance to employers that
they will not be liable for discrimination. First, the guidance letter and the
rule only address the amendments to the INA regulations pertaining to
document abuse. The rule does not protect employers who follow the safe-
harbor procedure more generally from charges of discrimination under the
INA or Title VII. The guidance letter is also just that-guidance to
employers, which may be revoked or changed at any time.
72
In addition, it is not clear that DHS has the authority to determine
whether an employer will be held liable under the INA's antidiscrimination
provision. DHS is charged with the authority to investigate whether an
employer has knowingly violated the INA's prohibition on hiring
unauthorized employees.'73 In contrast, the Department of Justice enforces
the INA antidiscrimination provision.'74  As a result, "[t]here is ... a
serious question whether DHS has impermissibly exceeded its authority...
by interpreting [the INA's] anti-discrimination provisions to preclude
enforcement where employers follow the safe-harbor framework."'
' 75
Therefore, ICE's assurance in the Federal Register commentary that
employers will not be held liable for discrimination under the INA is not as
reliable as it purports to be.
V. WORKING TOWARDS A UNIFIED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGY
A. The Rule Serves To Increase Cooperative Immigration Enforcement
The ICE rule is not without merits. Insofar as it generally seeks to
meet the INA's mandate that employers only provide work for eligible
employees, it should be commended for its attempt to provide guidance to
employers. The rule also provides a meaningful deterrent, constructive
knowledge, that encourages compliance.
The policy goal of ensuring that all workers in the United States are
legally authorized for employment calls for extensive collaboration
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (recognizing conflicting DHS messages
regarding immigration enforcement actions).
173. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at
45,614.
174. See id. ("The rule does not affect ... the authority of DOJ to enforce the anti-
discrimination provisions of the INA .... ).
175. Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 36, at 16.
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between employers and the government as well as interagency cooperation
within the government. The rule will foster these alliances in two regards.
First, the safe-harbor rule unifies the SSA and DHS no-match programs as
equivalent means of providing notice to an employer that a particular
employee may not be authorized for work. 7 6 As such, the rule seeks to
draw the SSA no-match program into the government's toolbox for
immigration enforcement. This level of coordination between the SSA and
ICE serves to increase the government's ability to uncover and prosecute
immigration violations.177 In addition, the cooperation could be particularly
beneficial in curbing the "rampant use of fraudulent documents" by
undocumented workers.'78 The importance of this alliance was seen in the
Swift case, where government agents and the employer detected unusual
trends among employment eligibility documents that indicated an
underlying pattern of identity theft.179
Second, the rule calls upon employers to play a more active role in
immigration enforcement. s°  Exacting immigration compliance from
employers has the potential to " 'be a very efficient tool' " if used
properly. 8' Under the good faith compliance provisions of the INA, some
employers currently avoid liability by stating they were not capable of
determining whether the documents offered by the unauthorized worker
were false or forged.'82 In contrast, employers proceeding under the ICE
safe-harbor procedure have a greater responsibility to respond to notice
from the SSA that there is a discrepancy with an employee's documents. 8 3
As seen in Part II, adverse consequences of this cooperation may fall
on employers. The safe-harbor procedure calls upon employers to take a
more active role in ensuring their workers are eligible to work; in the
process, however, employers may find themselves facing various
discrimination claims. Under DHS's stated policy of focusing on worksite
176. The rule covers both the SSA no-match letter and the DHS no-match letter. See Safe-
Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at 45,623-24
(adding the SSA and DHS no-match letters to a list of example situations from which
constructive knowledge may be inferred); supra note 130 and accompanying text (explaining the
DHS no-match letter).
177. See Amanda E. Schreyer, Note, Human Smuggling Across the U.S.-Mexico Border: U.S.
Laws Are Not Stopping It, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 795, 807-08 (2006).
178. Id. at 807.
179. Solis & Reddy, supra note 3.
180. DHS Secretary Chertoff stated the department's goal of discouraging employers from
"ignoring clear signs" of potential immigration violations and overcoming industry's "tolerance
of hiring illegal workers." DHS Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration Practices, supra note 11, at
5.
181. Greenhouse, supra note 39 (quoting Harvard professor George Borijas).
182. Id.
183. See Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. 45,611,45,613 (Aug. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a).
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compliance, employers effectively have little choice but to follow the safe-
harbor procedure in order to avoid a finding of constructive knowledge. 8"
As a result, the expected gains in immigration enforcement for the
government must be balanced against the resulting legal exposure to
employers who follow the safe-harbor procedure.
B. Proposals for Strengthening the Safe-Harbor Procedure
The safe-harbor rule should provide adequate legal protection to
employers who receive SSA no-match letters and respond according to the
recommended procedure. The rule intends to eliminate confusion for
employers who receive no-match letters and are concerned that the
employees who are the subject of the letters are not authorized to work in
the United States. However, in the process of providing a safe-harbor
procedure under the immigration laws, the rule raises additional questions
about an employer's liability for employment discrimination.'85 Thus, ICE
should strengthen the rule in two ways. First, the rule should create a
rebuttable presumption that the employer has not engaged in discrimination
by terminating employees at the conclusion of the safe-harbor procedure.
Second, ICE should provide employers with an additional choice upon the
unsuccessful completion of the safe-harbor procedure: employers should
be permitted to report to ICE that they cannot resolve the no-match
discrepancies. ICE will then prioritize worksite enforcement actions in
accordance with its own enforcement goals.'86
The first proposal to strengthen the ICE rule recognizes that the safe-
harbor procedure should properly live up to its name by providing more
protection for conduct undertaken during the safe-harbor procedure that
might constitute discrimination. Although DHS's legal authority to
184. The rule does not preclude employers from taking other measures to verify employment
documents, but DHS may nevertheless find constructive knowledge. See Safe-Harbor Procedures
for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at 45,614 (cautioning that "an
employer that followed a procedure other than the 'safe-harbor' procedures ... would face the
risk that DHS may not agree" that the employer's actions were reasonable); cf id. at 45,616
("[R]eceipt of an SSA no-match letter may create [a duty to investigate] depending on the totality
of the circumstances."). Given the devastating economic aftermath of a DHS raid, risk-averse
employers are well-advised to follow the stated safe-harbor procedure.
185. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission submitted a comment during the
public comment period, stating that it "strongly believes that the 'safe-harbor' procedure will only
work when the Department adopts a thorough step-by-step procedure that allows employers to act
affirmatively after receiving a no-match letter without exposing them to unwarranted liability
under the [equal employment opportunity] laws." Letter from Peggy R. Mastroianni, supra note
151.
186. See Fact Sheet, ICE, supra note 42 ("In accordance with ICE's homeland security
mission, ICE agents prioritize worksite enforcement efforts by focusing on sites related to critical
infrastructure and national security.").
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influence the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws has not yet been
litigated, an effective safe-harbor procedure must be able to address an
employer's obligations under both immigration and antidiscrimination
laws. The rule already addresses the potential for document abuse in the
secondary verification procedure by exempting it from conduct considered
abusive under the INA regulations.'87 In order to warn employers about the
potential for discrimination liability, the rule should likewise address the
termination decision in the text of the safe-harbor procedure.'88 After the
secondary verification requirement, an additional provision should follow
that confirms the no-match letter's warning that the letter itself is not a
"statement about an employee's immigration status" and that employers
risk various legal consequences for taking "adverse action against an
employee."' 89 This statement will serve to reiterate to employers, potential
plaintiffs, and the courts that the employer maintains its equal employment
opportunity obligations while following the safe-harbor procedure.
The rule should then provide that an employer who follows the safe-
harbor procedure and terminates an employee upon unsuccessful
verification of employment status will enjoy a rebuttable presumption that
it has not violated antidiscrimination statutes by following the safe-harbor
procedure. Evidence that the employer did not apply the safe-harbor
framework in a uniform manner for all employees would be relevant to
rebutting the presumption. 9' This provision relies upon a clear statement
in the rule about an employer's responsibility to take action or risk liability
if it cannot achieve employment verification as described above, which
currently only exists in the Federal Register commentary preceding the
rule. It also relies upon a clear showing that the employer terminated the
employee because it could not verify employment eligibility, such as is
provided by the 1-9 procedure, and not because it received an SSA no-
187. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. at
45,613-14; see supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
188. Currently, the safe-harbor procedure that will be inserted as an amendment to the INA
does not contain any language indicating an employer must choose between terminating the
employee and a finding of constructive knowledge. This language is found in the comments
preceding the rule. See Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter,
72 Fed. Reg. at 45,613.
189. See SSA No-Match Letter, supra note 25, at 2; accord Letter from Peggy R.
Mastroianni, supra note 151 (encouraging the inclusion of a statement "reminding employers that
any employment practice adversely affecting employees on the basis of race/color, physical
appearance, accent, religion, or any other foreign characteristic that potentially denotes immigrant
status, may violate anti-discrimination laws").
190. Cf Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 45,613-14 ("[E]mployers who follow the safe harbor procedures set forth in this rule
uniformly and without regard to perceived national origin or citizenship status as required by the
provisions of... the INA will not be found to have engaged in unlawful discrimination.").
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match letter. This distinction reflects the tradition that a determination of
work authorization status originates solely with the 1-9. In keeping with the
reality that an SSA no-match letter is one indication that an employee may
be undocumented, this proposal also acknowledges that notice of a
worker's ineligible status may surface via other documents such as the W-
2. If amended as such, the rule will more accurately reflect the employer's
effective lack of choice to continue to employ someone whose eligibility
status cannot be reasonably verified using the safe-harbor procedure.
Because a rebuttable presumption is potentially overinclusive,
employees must be protected against discriminatory practices more
generally, such as when employers terminate without permitting certain
employees to correct SSA discrepancies in a timely fashion. In other
words, the suggested revisions to the ICE safe-harbor rule are narrow, and
they would only apply to the employer's decision to terminate upon an
unsuccessful attempt to verify employment eligibility under the safe-harbor
procedure. An employee could rebut the presumption by presenting
evidence that the employer used the SSA no-match letter as pretext for
discriminatory employment practices or that the employer discriminated
against the employee in some other manner. The rebuttable presumption
would therefore follow the burden-shifting scheme sanctioned by existing
antidiscrimination law.' 91
Second, the rule should permit employers to rely on ICE agents to
verify employment eligibility if the safe-harbor procedure does not resolve
the SSA discrepancy. The INA's good faith compliance standard charges
employers with the responsibility for reviewing documents for reasonable
authenticity, but ICE should retain the ultimate burden of determining
employment eligibility. This result comports with congressional intent to
limit the employer's liability exposure when it passed the IRCA. 192
Specifically, Congress intended for the INS, whose enforcement functions
are now handled by ICE, to "assist [employers] in a timely manner" if they
desire to "check on the authenticity of any alien identification
document."' 93
As it stands, the rule serves to deputize employers as the primary
enforcers of immigration laws. Employers are ill-suited to this role
191. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII's burden-shifting
scheme as applied in Zamora).
192. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 56-57, 61-62 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5660-61, 5665-66 (describing both the "good faith" defense designed to
"protect both employers and prospective employees in the event cautious employers are unduly
concerned by documentation presented to them" and the expectation that "INS officials [will]
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because they lack the proper training and experience in scrutinizing
employment documents,194 it is misaligned with their economic interests as
profit-driven businesses, and it triggers potential liability under
antidiscrimination laws. Instead, ICE should shoulder the burden of
verifying document authenticity. Once the employer, employee, and SSA
are all aware of the SSN discrepancy, the employer should self-report to
ICE that it is unable to resolve the no-match so that ICE can elect to pursue
an appropriate investigation.
This proposal would benefit ICE agents by initially relieving them of
the responsibility for determining if a true mismatch, as opposed to a
clerical or other harmless error, exists. ICE would thus be able to utilize its
resources more efficiently. The self-reporting option should also come at a
price to employers: it should not undercut the valuable progress against
identity theft and forged document rings that ICE worksite enforcement
missions seek to achieve. An employer who self-reports, rather than taking
action to terminate the employee(s) as suggested by the safe-harbor rule,
would not be shielded from worksite enforcement actions. However, self-
reporting would permit the employer to call for an accurate determination
of its employees' work eligibility so that it could be certain it was only
terminating work-ineligible employees. Although the practical result may
be the same--en masse terminations at the conclusion of the safe-harbor
procedure or after ICE verification-employers would be more certain of
their compliance with both immigration and employment discrimination
laws, and they would be better protected from liabilities that could
potentially arise from the terminations.
This Comment has proposed two solutions to protect employers who
follow the safe-harbor procedure for SSA no-match letters from additional
liability for employment discrimination. Protecting the decision to follow
the safe-harbor procedure is necessary to permit employers to ensure their
own compliance under the immigration laws. Furthermore, permitting
employers to call upon ICE to authenticate employment eligibility at the
conclusion of the safe-harbor procedure would ensure that the ultimate
responsibility for work authorization remains with the government
enforcement agency that controls eligibility.
CONCLUSION
Social security no-match letters are designed to inform employers that
an employee's retirement, disability, and survivor benefits are in jeopardy
due to a mismatching name and SSN on the employee's W-2. The
mismatch is often the result of a routine clerical error or other harmless
194. See AILA Letter, supra note 154, at 13.
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documentation error. However, the no-match letter could also serve as a
red flag to the employer that the employee is not authorized to work in the
United States. The ICE safe-harbor rule seeks to capitalize on SSA records
by permitting immigration officials to consider receipt of an SSA no-match
letter as part of the rule's calculus of whether an employer knowingly
violated the INA prohibition on hiring unauthorized workers. In doing so,
the rule provides needed guidance to employers who are rightfully
concerned about whether employees designated in the letters are eligible to
work in the United States.
With the exception of acknowledging the potential for document
abuse under the INA, the safe-harbor procedure fails to adequately address
the employer's potential liability for employment discrimination. As a
result, employers who terminate on the basis of the no-match letter risk
suits alleging that the employer discriminated against its employees. The
rule should be revised in consideration of the liability that employers face
when they terminate employees under the safe-harbor procedure. First,
employers should enjoy a rebuttable presumption that they have not
committed unlawful discrimination by their decision to follow the safe-
harbor procedure in the ICE rule. Terminated employees, however, would
be able to rebut the presumption by providing evidence of discrimination.
Second, ICE should provide employers with three options at the conclusion
of the safe-harbor procedure: (1) terminate the employee who cannot
verify employment eligibility and risk liability for unlawful discrimination;
(2) continue to employ the individual at the risk that ICE will find
constructive knowledge of an immigration violation; or (3) permit
employers to self-report to ICE that they could not verify the eligibility of
their employees using the safe-harbor procedure. Providing the third
option of self-reporting would permit the employer to avoid taking adverse
employment actions that could trigger discrimination liability while
awaiting determinative verification from ICE. If these modifications are
adopted, employers who actively seek to comply with immigration and
employment laws will truly enjoy a safe harbor when confronted with a
Social Security no-match letter.
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